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FAMILY LAW–PROVIDING FOR THOSE WHO CANNOT PROVIDE FOR
THEMSELVES: A PROPOSAL FOR THE ARKANSAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO
FOLLOW IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF AN ALREADY EXPANSIVE GUARDIANSHIP
LAW AND GRANT GUARDIANS THE RIGHT TO FILE FOR DIVORCE ON
BEHALF OF A WARD
I. INTRODUCTION
An ambulance transports Isaac, an incapacitated person, to a nearby
emergency room after he is involved in an accident that causes him severe
injuries. An hour later, Isaac’s guardian, Greg, arrives. The physician informs Greg that without conducting a certain operation Isaac might not live.
Suppose that after the proposed procedure, although alive, Isaac’s condition
deteriorates. Greg reasons that Isaac would be better off if he passed away.
Greg petitions the circuit court, and, upon its approval, informs the physician that he would like to withhold life-saving treatment.
In Arkansas, a guardian like Greg, upon court approval, is legally entitled to do just that—petition the circuit court and then give consent to withhold life-saving treatment for a ward like Isaac.1 A guardian is also legally
entitled to consent on behalf of an incapacitated person to abortion, sterilization, psychosurgery, or removal of a bodily organ.2 In life or death situations, the guardian does not even need to seek court approval for these decisions.3 Moreover, upon court approval, a guardian may authorize experimental medical procedures, authorize termination of parental rights, and
prohibit the incapacitated person from voting.4
Notably absent from these statutory powers granted to the guardian is
the right to bring a divorce suit on behalf of the ward.5
In the absence of a statute so authorizing it, it is the general rule that an
insane person cannot institute an action for divorce since the right to do
so is regarded as strictly personal to the aggrieved spouse and no matrimonial offenses automatically effect a dissolution of the marriage. 6

The sustainability of this defense—that marriage is “strictly personal”—
invokes skepticism given the aforementioned powers that are now granted to
the guardian. Moreover, in a society that has drastically transformed its ac1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-302(a)(1)(B) (Repl. 2012).
Id. § 28-65-302(a)(1)(A).
Id.
Id. § 28-65-302(a)(1)(C)–(E).
See id. § 28-65-302.
Jackson v. Bowman, 226 Ark. 753, 759, 294 S.W.2d 344, 347 (1956).
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ceptance of divorce, as evidenced by the near fifty percent divorce rate
across the country,7 a strong case can be made for the need for legislation in
Arkansas granting a guardian the right to file for divorce on behalf of a
ward.
Historically, many states have struggled, and continue to struggle, with
this question of guardianship power,8 and, in Arkansas, this is an issue that
no appellate court has directly addressed.9 Thus, the interest of the state in
providing clarity will be heightened when this issue presents itself in the
future. The Arkansas legislature should be proactive in amending its current
guardianship statute by enacting legislation that explicitly allows, upon
court approval, for a guardian to file a divorce action on behalf of a ward. In
light of the expansion of guardianship powers that presently provide for
personal decisions that carry weight equal to or greater than the dissolution
of marriage,10 this legislation would not overstep the bounds of guardianship
power.
Once the initial right to bring action has been established through legislation, and after both standing to bring the suit and prima facie grounds to
hear the case have been satisfied, courts should strictly adhere to a substituted judgment standard in deciding whether to grant the divorce. Under this
strict standard, a divorce would only be permissible when objective evidence of the ward’s intent to dissolve the marriage is present.11 By adhering
to this standard, the court has the ability to curb any potential risks that
guardians would file for divorce to promote his or her personal interests.12
Before reaching this conclusion, it is necessary to analyze both the rationale behind the different approaches to this problem as well as the historical context of the law in Arkansas.13 In Part II.B and II.C, this note examines how other states have dealt with a guardian’s right to file for divorce in
the absence of statutory authority and discusses the policies behind the majority opinion that guardians are legally prohibited from filing for divorce,
as well as the contrasting minority opinion that guardians are legally entitled
to file for divorce. Part II.D then establishes that both Arkansas divorce law

7. See Christopher Ingraham, Divorce Is Actually on the Rise, and It’s the Baby Boomers’ Fault, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
wp/2014/03/27/divorce-is-actually-on-the-rise-and-its-the-baby-boomers-fault/.
8. See infra Parts II.B–C.
9. See infra Part II.D.2.
10. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-302.
11. Ruvalcaba v. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d 674, 685 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (Fidel, J., concurring).
12. See Bella Feinstein, A New Solution to an Age-Old Problem: Statutory Authorization
for Guardian-Initiated Divorces, 10 NAELA J. 203, 218 (2014) (noting that courts have
imposed heightened standards on guardians to safeguard against potential abuse of power).
13. See infra Parts II.B–D.
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and guardianship law are silent on this issue and that Arkansas case law is
void of a holding on which subsequent courts may stand.
Part III further analyzes the policy behind the minority approach as it
relates to Arkansas and then proposes legislation that embodies the concerns
of the minority by advocating for the guardian’s right to bring suit.14 Nevertheless, Part III.C recognizes the majority’s concern for the sanctity of marriage and recommends that the court use a substituted judgment standard,
where divorce will only be granted if it conforms to the ward’s wishes.15
II. BACKGROUND
This section first addresses the responsibilities guardians have in
providing for wards, both personally and legally.16 These responsibilities,
however, may not always extend to divorce suits on behalf of the ward. In
addressing whether a guardian may petition the court for divorce on behalf
of the ward in the absence of statutory authority specifying otherwise, state
courts are divided on the issue.17 The competing rationales of each approach
will be discussed18 before turning to the current state of the law in Arkansas.19
A.

The Role of the Guardian Under Arkansas Statutory Law

In defining the role of the guardian, it should first be established to
whom powers of guardianship extend. Arkansas Code Annotated section 2865-101 defines both the ward and an incapacitated person.20 A “ward” is “an
incapacitated person for whom a guardian has been appointed.”21 An “incapacitated person” is:
a person who is impaired by reason of a disability such as mental illness,
mental deficiency, physical illness, chronic use of drugs, or chronic intoxication, to the extent of lacking sufficient understanding or capacity to
make or communicate decisions to meet the essential requirements for
his or her health or safety or to manage his or her estate. 22

14. See infra Parts III.A–B.
15. See infra Part III.C.2.
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. See infra Parts II.B.1, II.C.1.
18. See infra Parts II.B.2, II.C.2.
19. See infra Part II.D.
20. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-101(5)(A), (10) (Repl. 2012).
21. Id. § 28-65-101(10).
22. Id. § 28-65-101(5)(A). An “incapacitated person” also “includes an endangered or
impaired adult as defined in the Adult Maltreatment Custody Act, [codified at ARK. CODE
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Any person may file a petition to the court to appoint himself as guardian of another.23 In that petition, he must state the reasons why appointment
is sought and his interest in such appointment.24 Before the court grants
guardianship, the petitioner must satisfy all of the following: (1) the ward is
either a minor or an incapacitated person; (2) guardianship is needed to protect the incapacitated person’s interests; and (3) the person appointed as
guardian is qualified.25
Once appointed by a court, the role of the guardian in caring for the
ward is clearthe duty of the guardian is to care for and to maintain the
ward.26 Guardianship power, however, is subject to certain limits.27 Guardianship shall be “[u]sed only as is necessary to promote and protect the wellbeing of the person and his or her property, [d]esigned to encourage the development of maximum self-reliance and independence of the person, and
[o]rdered only to the extent necessitated by the person’s actual mental, physical, and adoptive limitations.”28 Another important limitation is that the
guardian may not promote his personal interests over those of the ward.29
As previously addressed, the guardian must obtain a court order to
make certain decisions for the ward.30 Yet, outside of these decisions, an
incapacitated person “retains all legal and civil rights except those which
have been expressly limited by court order or have been specifically granted
by order to the guardian by the court.”31 And, because incompetents are considered to be under legal disability that renders them unable to sue or be
sued, incompetent persons are required to appear in court through a legal

ANN.] § 9-20-103, who is in the custody of the Department of Human Services.” Id. § 28-65101(5)(B).
23. Id. § 28-65-205(a) (Repl. 2012).
24. Id. § 28-65-205(b)(9).
25. Id. § 28-65-210 (Repl. 2012).
26. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-301(a)(1) (Repl. 2012); see also 39 C.J.S. Guardian &
Ward § 97 (2014) (citing Jewish Home for the Elderly of Fairfield Cnty., Inc. v. Cantore, 778
A.2d 93, 100 (Conn. 2001)) (explaining that a guardian owes a duty of loyalty to the ward
and is bound to protect the ward’s interests).
27. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-105 (Repl. 2012).
28. Id. (citations omitted).
29. See Guardian & Ward, supra note 26, at § 97 (citing SunTrust Bank, Middle Ga.
N.A. v. Harper, 551 S.E.2d 419, 426 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001)) (providing that a guardian may not
place himself in a position in which his personal interests are in conflict with the ward’s);
Omohundro v. Erhart, 228 Ark. 910, 911, 311 S.W.2d 309, 311 (1958) (“[T]he sole purpose
of this guardianship is to further the well-being of the afflicted ward.”).
30. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-302 (Repl. 2012).
31. Id. § 28-65-106 (Repl. 2012).
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guardian, a next friend, or a guardian ad litem.32 Thus, generally, a guardian
has the right and capacity to sue on behalf of the ward.33
Notwithstanding this general rule, states have faced, and will continue
to face, the following issue: whether a guardian may bring a divorce action
on behalf of the ward absent clear authority stating otherwise. This issue has
led to two competing schools of thought.34 On the one hand, a majority of
courts deny a guardian this right,35 while, on the other hand, some courts
provide for such right.36
B.

The Majority Approach and Policy Reasoning Behind This Approach

In the absence of express statutory authority, the majority rule is that a
guardian may not file for divorce on behalf of a ward.37 This rule is most
prominently founded upon the personal nature of marriage and the notion
that divorce is a decision that no one other than the aggrieved spouse should
decide.38 Pursuant to this rule, the mentally incompetent spouse lacks the
legal capacity to make a decision concerning divorce, and a guardian cannot
make that decision for her.39 Furthermore, courts have reached this conclusion despite statutes granting a guardian authority to bring suit for civil actions on behalf of the incompetent ward.40
1.

Case Law Articulating the Majority Rule

The following case law serves as support for the majority rule regarding guardians’ authority to bring divorce suits on behalf of a ward. In Murray v. Murray,41 which was a case of first impression in South Carolina,42
32. Guardian & Ward, supra note 26, at § 255 (citing Carlos H. v. Lindsay M., 815
N.W.2d 168, 173 (Neb. 2012)) (deciding that the law grants another party the capacity to sue
on a minor or incompetent’s behalf because both lack legal authority to sue).
33. Id.
34. See infra Parts II.B–C.
35. See infra Part II.B.1.
36. See infra Part II.C.1.
37. Murray v. Murray, 426 S.E.2d 781, 783 (S.C. 1993) (citing cases from across the
country where courts have recognized this as the majority rule).
38. Diane Snow Mills, Comment, “But I Love What’s-His-Name”: Inherent Dangers in
the Changing Role of the Guardian in Divorce Actions on Behalf of Incompetents, 16 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 527, 536 (2000).
39. Nelson v. Nelson, 878 P.2d 335, 338 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
40. Edward B. Borris, Mentally Incompetent Spouses as Parties to Divorce Actions,
DIVORCE LITIG., March 1997, at 52, 52; see Murray, 426 S.E.2d at 783 (“Although there are
statutes in practically every jurisdiction which give a guardian the general authority to maintain actions on behalf of an incompetent, it is generally held that these statutes do not apply to
divorce actions unless the statute expressly so states.”).
41. 426 S.E.2d 781 (S.C. 1993).
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the Supreme Court of South Carolina adopted the majority rule and held that
an incompetent spouse, if incompetent as to his person and his property,
could not bring a divorce either on his own behalf or through a guardian.43
The court declined to adopt an absolute rule, however, that barred the incompetent or guardian from bringing an action in all cases.44 The court provided that a spouse may still bring suit on his own behalf or through a
guardian if, although mentally incompetent as to the affairs of his estate, he
is able to make reasonable decisions as to his person, to understand the nature of the action, and to express a desire to dissolve the marriage.45 The
court reasoned that it was for the judge to decide the ward’s competency as
to his ability to comprehend personal decisions and remanded this case so
that decision could be made.46
Similarly, in Scott v. Scott,47 which was another case of first impres48
sion, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that the decision to divorce
must remain personal to the aggrieved spouse.49 The court reasoned that
there are no marital offenses that result in the automatic dissolution of a
marriage.50 Rather, marriage may only be dissolved with the consent of and
upon action by the injured spouse,51 and these are two things an insane person cannot do.52
2.

The Rationale and Policy Behind the Majority Approach

The rationale behind the majority approach is primarily focused on the
nature of marriage and has been deemed a “lesser of two evils” approach.53
Courts contend that divorce is strictly personal and volitional and cannot be
maintained upon the will of the guardian,54 even though that may lead to an
indissoluble marriage on behalf of the ward.55 In part, this reason is based on
42. Id. at 783.
43. Id. at 784.
44. Id.
45. Id. The court directed that if the spouse can express a desire to obtain a divorce, he
may obtain a divorce through his guardian ad litem. Id.
46. Id.
47. 45 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 1950).
48. Id. at 879.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Mills, supra note 38, at 536.
54. Murray v. Murray, 426 S.E.2d 781, 784 (S.C. 1993).
55. Id.; see J.A. Connelly, Annotation, Power of Incompetent Spouse’s Guardian, Committee, or Next Friend to Sue for Granting or Vacation of Divorce or Annulment of Marriage,
or to Make a Compromise or Settlement in Such Suit, 6 A.L.R.3D 681, § 2 (1966) (“[T]he
right of the injured party to regard the bond of marriage as indissoluble . . . is considered so
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the fact that no marital offenses exist that result in a dissolution of the marital relation.56
This position has been considered the “lesser of two evils” approach,
whereby the protection of a potential decision by the aggrieved spouse to
stay married, even in light of marital offenses, outweighs the guardian’s
thought that the marriage should be dissolved based on those marital offenses.57 The concern courts face is that a third party’s interests will override the
wishes of the incompetent spouse.58 The conclusion is that any position other than the majority’s “would destroy the effect of condonation,” which
“preserves to the injured spouse the right to forgive, excuse or pardon.”59 In
the end, despite what a guardian may believe best, an aggrieved spouse may
choose to stay in a marriage that could be deemed against her interests for
personal, religious, moral, or economic reasons.60 Notwithstanding this majority view, a contingency of courts holds otherwise and grants a guardian
the legal right to file for divorce on behalf of an incompetent ward.
C.

The Minority Approach and Policy Reasoning Behind This Approach

When statutory authority does not explicitly grant a guardian the right
to file for divorce on behalf of an incompetent ward, the minority trend in
courts addressing this issue is to allow a guardian to do so.61 This trend
stems from courts first recognizing both expansive guardianship rights as
well as inequity principles62 and then relying on state divorce, guardianship,
or civil procedure statutes for authority to allow a guardian to bring such
action.63

strictly personal that such relation should not be dissolved except with the personal consent
of the injured spouse, which cannot be given where he or she is insane.”).
56. Connelly, supra note 55, at § 2.
57. Mills, supra note 38, at 536.
58. Nelson v. Nelson, 878 P.2d 335, 338 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
59. Scott v. Scott, 45 So. 2d 878, 879 (Fla. 1950).
60. Nelson, 878 P.2d at 338.
61. See id. (“Jurisdictions allowing divorce suits brought or maintained by a guardian
are in the minority.”).
62. See infra Part II.C.2.
63. Mills, supra note 38, at 536. The New Mexico Court of Appeals in Nelson points out
that most minority-rule courts that grant a guardian the right to bring an action for divorce do
so by construing statutes that allow for guardians to pursue civil claims for the ward. 878
P.2d at 338 (citing Campbell v. Campbell, 5 So. 2d 401, 402 (Ala. 1941); Ruvalcaba v.
Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d 674, 678 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Kronberg v. Kronberg, 623 A.2d 806,
809–10 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993)).
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Case Law Articulating the Minority Trend

Arizona and New Mexico are at the forefront of minority-rule jurisdictions.64 In Ruvalcaba v. Ruvalcaba,65 the Court of Appeals of Arizona held
that pursuant to Arizona’s guardianship provisions the guardian was not
prohibited from bringing suit on behalf of an incapacitated ward.66 The court
reasoned that guardians have broad authority.67 Further, the court found
nothing in either Arizona Revised Statutes section 14-5312(A) or Rule 17(g)
of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure that precluded a guardian from
maintaining an action for dissolution68 and concluded that if the legislature
wanted to prohibit third parties from bringing suit then it would have done
so.69 The counter argumentif the legislature had wanted guardians to have
authority, it would have included that power in the statutewas explicitly
rejected.70
Similarly, the decision made by the Court of Appeals of New Mexico
in Nelson v. Nelson71 put New Mexico in the category of states that views
the rights of the incompetent as equally important to those of the competent
spouse.72 At the time the court decided this case, the issue was one of first
impression in New Mexico.73 Finding Ruvalcaba instructive,74 the court also
noted that New Mexico’s guardianship statutes grant guardians broad powers.75 The court determined that the New Mexico legislature granted guardians authority to interfere in intimately personal concerns of an individual’s
64. See Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d at 678; Nelson, 878 P.2d at 339–40.
65. 850 P.2d 674.
66. Id. at 678. The court allowed the guardian to proceed after concluding that was what
the ward would want, based on what the guardian knew of the ward’s preferences and general
values regarding marriage, divorce, and manner of living. Id. at 681.
67. Id. at 678. Citing Arizona Revised Statutes section 14-5312, the court determined
that the language in the statute that equates guardians’ authority over the ward to parents’
authority over their children was meant to illustrate the breadth of guardians’ powers. Id.
Further, the court provided that Rule 17(g) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure states that
a guardian “may sue or defend on behalf of . . . the incompetent person” without regard for
the type of case. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 678–79.
70. Id. at 678.
71. 878 P.2d 335 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
72. Vincent E. Martinez, Family Law—New Mexico Expands the Power of a Guardian
to Include the Right to Initiate and Maintain a Divorce Action on Behalf of the Guardian’s
Incompetent Ward: Nelson v. Nelson, 25 N.M. L. REV. 295, 295 (1995).
73. Nelson, 878 P.2d at 337.
74. Id. at 339.
75. Id. at 339–40. Under New Mexico’s guardianship statute, the guardian has powers
and duties related to the following: custody, care, training, education, personal effects, medical and professional care, and removing or withholding medical treatment. See N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 45-5-312(B) (West 2009).

2016]

GUARDIANS' RIGHT TO FILE FOR DIVORCE

279

life76 and held that the mere condition of being under guardianship does not
preclude divorce action.77
Other cases also help illustrate the decision-making process used by
courts in finding a legal basis for guardians to petition the court for divorce
on behalf of a ward. In Cohn v. Carlisle,78 a Massachusetts court relied on
the Massachusetts General Code and stated, “[p]roceedings at law and in
equity in [sic] behalf of a person incapable of bringing an action or a suit
may be brought in his name by his guardian, conservator, or next friend.”79
Similarly, in Campbell v. Campbell,80 an Alabama court granted a guardian
the right to bring divorce after construing a statute authorizing guardians to
pursue and defend claims in the interest of the ward as well as a statute
granting the circuit court the right to divorce persons.81 Finally, in Luster v.
Luster,82 a Connecticut court stated:
Given that a conserved person, except in limited circumstances, may
bring a civil action only through a properly appointed representative,
such as a conservator, and that an action for dissolution of marriage is a
civil action, combined with the conserved person’s retention of all rights
and authority not specifically assigned, we conclude that a conservator
may bring a civil action for dissolution of marriage on behalf of a conserved person.83

In Luster, the court relied on a Connecticut statute that provides for an
incompetent’s interests to be adequately represented, not deprived of access
to the courts.84 The court reasoned that the law attempts to ensure that a conserved person’s interests are not undermined by his disability85 and that the
legislature could have restricted a conserved person’s ability to file action
through his conservator.86 In accordance with the reasoning provided by the
76. Nelson, 878 P.2d at 340 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-312(B)). The court determined that these powers are listed without qualification and “should be read as illustrative of
the nature of the guardian’s power.” Id.
77. Id.
78. 37 N.E.2d 260 (Mass. 1941).
79. Id. at 262 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201, §§ 20, 37 (West 2008) (repealed
2008)); see also McGrew v. McGrew, 9 Haw. 475, 479 (1894) (relying on a guardianship
statute that provided the duty to “appear for and represent his ward in all legal suits and proceedings” and reasoning that divorce is a civil proceeding).
80. 5 So. 2d 401 (Ala. 1941).
81. Id. at 402.
82. 17 A.3d 1068 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
83. Id. at 1080.
84. Id. at 1078–79. Section 45a–650(k) states, “[a] conserved person shall retain all
rights and authority not expressly assigned to the conservator.” CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
45a-650(k) (West 2014) (emphasis added).
85. Luster, 17 A.3d at 1079.
86. Id. at 1080.
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court in Luster, finding such legal authority for a guardian to bring an action
for divorce on behalf of a ward also stems from the following policy implications.
2.

The Rationale and Policy Behind the Minority Approach

Minority-rule jurisdiction courts base their decisions on the expansion
of guardian rights and inequity principles.87 First, courts have reasoned that
the majority rule is no longer valid because guardians are now able to make
personal decisions in other areas for the ward.88 This notion is exemplified
by the court in Ruvalcaba, where the court determined that in modern times,
when a guardian may refuse medical care on behalf of the ward, maintaining
the same “personal” justification cannot stand.89 There, the court continued,
“[i]f an incompetent’s right to refuse medical treatment is not expunged by
physical or mental impairment, surely an incompetent’s right to petition for
dissolution of marriage is similarly not destroyed by physical or mental incapacity.”90
Another primary policy reason of the minority is based on an inequity
principle—the idea that the incompetent is subject to the absolute control of
the competent spouse if the guardian may not bring suit.91 In essence, without any ability to dissolve the marriage, the incompetent spouse is left “captive” to the competent spouse.92 In such case, the incompetent could be exploited, physically injured, or even perish at the will of the competent
spouse.93 Consequently, courts refuse to establish an absolute bar to divorce
that would leave an incompetent spouse at the mercy of the competent

87. See, e.g., Ruvalcaba v. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d 674, 681 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (noting
that a guardian now has the ability to refuse medical care); In re Gannon, 702 P.2d 465, 467
(Wash. 1985) (providing that an incompetent spouse is subject to the control of the competent
spouse).
88. See In re Gannon, 702 P.2d at 467 (“[I]n these days of termination of life support,
tax consequences of virtually all economic decisions, no-fault dissolutions and the other
vagaries of a vastly changing society, we think an absolute rule denying authority is not justified nor in the public interest.”); Nelson v. Nelson, 878 P.2d 335, 340 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994)
(citing the following areas of guardianship power: charge of care, comfort, maintenance,
education, personal effects, withholding consent to medical treatment, and consent to physician’s termination of maintenance medical treatment).
89. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d at 681.
90. Id.
91. In re Gannon, 702 P.2d at 467.
92. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d at 681.
93. Id. at 683–84. A guardian’s ability to file for divorce is an important protection
measure against exploitation or abuse by the competent spouse. Id. at 685 (McGregor, J.,
concurring).

2016]

GUARDIANS' RIGHT TO FILE FOR DIVORCE

281

spouse.94 As surmised in Eichner v. Dillon,95 “the terminally ill should be
treated equally, whether competent or incompetent” for the “value of human
dignity extends to both.”96
Relatedly, in Ruvalcaba, the court also addressed and countered the
majority’s concern that the guardian’s motives would supersede those of the
ward.97 The court noted that ulterior motives apply equally to guardians as
well as the competent spouse.98 In those hypothetical situations, a competent
spouse may seek, for example, financial advantage or may keep the marriage intact to maintain immigration status.99 Thus, a competent spouse’s
testimony contains just as much risk as a third party’s testimony.100 As such,
the “ulterior motive” precaution is not a sufficient reason to bar either the
guardian or the spouse’s testimony.101 Rather, deference should be given to
the trial court to view the evidence, determine its credibility, and assign a
weight to the testimony.102
3.

Competing Standards of Review Once a Guardian Petitions the
Court for Divorce

If a court finds that a guardian has the legal right to petition the court
for divorce on behalf of the ward, the court must then determine whether it
should grant the divorce. Because the ward’s wishes cannot be ascertained
at the time of the proceedings, two prominent standards exist in guiding a
court’s decision: (1) a substituted judgment standard and (2) a best interests
standard.103 Under either standard, the guardian bears the burden of proof in
establishing the ward’s wishes.104
Under a substituted judgment standard, the guardian tries to conclude
what the ward would have decided if he or she were competent,105 and the
94. Nelson v. Nelson, 878 P.2d 335, 339 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); see In re Gannon, 702
P.2d at 467 (explaining that, generally, a guardian should not determine this decision to bring
dissolution on behalf of the ward, but some circumstances may warrant it).
95. 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
96. Id. at 542.
97. See Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d at 682–83.
98. Id. at 683.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 682–83 (citing In re Ballard, 762 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Or. Ct. App. 1988))
(recognizing the risk is just as great that the competent spouse is biased).
101. Id. at 683.
102. Id. (citing In re Ballard, 762 P.2d at 1053).
103. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d at 682.
104. Id.
105. See Norman L. Cantor, Discarding Substituted Judgment and Best Interests: Toward
a Constructive Preference Standard for Dying, Previously Competent Patients Without Advance Instructions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 1193, 1201–02 (1996) (explaining that substituted
judgment attempts to replicate the decision the incompetent would make if competent in the

282

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

court acts on behalf of the incompetent.106 The court determines the ward’s
intent using objective evidence,107 such as written documents, evidence of
oral statements while competent, or the ward’s general disposition.108 Therefore, this standard serves as a type of “surrogate decision-making” that may
be used only when evidence exists of the ward’s values and wishes while
competent.109 In contrast, when no evidence exists as to the ward’s prior or
present disposition or intent, the court will determine this issue based on
what is in the best interests of the ward.110
Under the best interests standard, a guardian attempts to determine
what the ward’s best interests are at the present time,111 and the court holds a
hearing to obtain evidence as to the best course of action for the ward.112 The
court decides whether divorce would “further the ward’s immediate and
long-term interests” and considers “the ward’s values, lifestyle and goals in
making that determination.”113 Moreover, during this hearing, the court also
considers the interests of the competent spouse.114
Having reviewed the majority and minority approaches as well as the
standards of review employed by courts when a guardian has the legal right
to file for divorce on behalf of an incompetent ward, this note now turns
toward the current state of the law in Arkansas.
D.

Current State of the Law in Arkansas

Stare decisis, which involves a court’s choice to stand by precedent,115
serves as a foundation of law. Additionally, it is well known that courts will
current situation); Kurt X. Metzmeier, The Power of an Incompetent Adult to Petition for
Divorce Through a Guardian or Next Friend, 33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 949, 956 (1995)
(explaining that the guardian attempts to determine the choice of a hypothetically competent
ward).
106. Walter M. Weber, Substituted Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, ISSUES L. &
MED. 131, 135 (1985).
107. See Brockman ex rel. Jennings v. Young, 2011 WL 5419713, at *4 (Ky. Ct. App.
2011) (citing Metzmeier, supra note 105, at 958) (explaining that in determining whether it is
proper to allow a divorce proceeding brought on behalf of a ward, courts may use evidence of
the ward’s intent and then substitute its judgment for the ward’s).
108. Metzmeier, supra note 105, at 956.
109. Mills, supra note 38, at 544.
110. Brockman, 2011 WL 5419713, at *4.
111. Metzmeier, supra note 105, at 957.
112. In re Gannon, 702 P.2d 465, 467 (Wash. 1985). Cases that involve abuse, neglect, or
possible exploitation of the ward are cases in which this standard is most aptly applied. Mills,
supra note 38, at 544.
113. Feinstein, supra note 12, at 218.
114. In re Gannon, 702 P.2d at 467. The court will put great emphasis not only on the
interests of the ward but also the necessities and interests of the competent spouse. Id.
115. Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis as Judicial Doctrine, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411,
412 (2010).
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follow unambiguous statutes or attempt to interpret those that are ambiguous.116 Accordingly, it is necessary to review both Arkansas case law and
statutory law to determine whether this issue has been previously addressed
or whether it is an issue of first impression.
1.

Arkansas Lacks Explicit Statutory Authority That Grants or Denies a Guardian the Right to File for Divorce on Behalf of the
Ward

Arkansas divorce law does not explicitly state whether a guardian has
the authority to petition a court for divorce on behalf of a ward.117 The Arkansas legislature has addressed the legal right for the competent spouse to
bring action against the incompetent ward, but not vice-versa.118 Arkansas
Code Annotated section 9-12-301 provides the following:
The circuit court shall have power to dissolve and set aside a marriage
contract, not only from bed and board, but from the bonds of matrimony,
for the following causes: In all cases in which a husband and wife have
lived separate and apart for three (3) consecutive years without cohabitation by reason of the incurable insanity of one (1) of them, the court shall
grant a decree of absolute divorce upon the petition of the sane spouse if
the proof shows that the insane spouse has been committed to an institution for the care and treatment of the insane for three (3) or more years
prior to the filing of the suit, has been adjudged to be of unsound mind
by a court of competent jurisdiction, and has not been discharged from
such adjudication by the court and the proof of insanity is supported by
the evidence of two (2) reputable physicians familiar with the mental
condition of the spouse, one (1) of whom shall be a regularly practicing
physician in the community wherein the spouse resided, and when the
insane spouse has been confined in an institution for the care and treatment of the insane, that the proof in the case is supported by the evidence
of the superintendent or one (1) of the physicians of the institution
wherein the insane spouse has been confined.119

The code further provides that “[s]ervice of process upon an insane spouse
shall be had by service of process upon the duly appointed, qualified, and
116. See, e.g., Faulkner v. Ark. Children’s Hosp., 347 Ark. 941, 952, 69 S.W.3d 393, 400
(2002) (“When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort
to rules of statutory construction. Where the meaning is not clear, we look to the language of
the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the
remedy provided, the legislative history, and other appropriate means that shed light on the
subject.”).
117. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301 (Repl. 2009).
118. See id. § 9-12-301(b)(6)(A).
119. Id. (emphasis added).
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acting guardian of the insane spouse or upon a duly appointed guardian ad
litem for the insane spouse . . . .”120
In sum, the statute does not mention whether the incompetent ward has
the ability to petition the court for divorce; rather, it suggests that the court
will only grant a divorce when the competent spouse brings an action for
divorce.121 Also, the only role the guardian appears to play is to accept service of process if the sane spouse files a petition.122
Similarly, Arkansas guardianship law does not address whether a
guardian has the authority to petition a court for divorce on behalf of a ward,
as the statutory provision listing the actions for which a guardian can petition the court does not provide for the court to consider this issue.123 Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-65-302 states as follows:
No guardian appointed prior to October 1, 2001, shall make any of the
following decisions without filing a petition and receiving express court
approval: (A) Consent on behalf of the incapacitated person to abortion,
sterilization, psychosurgery, or removal of bodily organs except when
necessary in a situation threatening the life of the incapacitated; (B) Consent to withholding life-saving treatment; (C) Authorize experimental
medical procedures; (D) Authorize termination of parental rights; (E)
Prohibit the incapacitated person from voting; (F) Prohibit the incapacitated person from obtaining a driver’s license; or (G) Consent to a settlement or compromise of any claim by or against the incapacitated person or his or her estate.124

Noticeably absent from that list is whether a guardian may petition the court
for divorce on behalf of the ward. Because the provisions in neither the divorce nor guardianship code explicitly grant or deny the guardian such authority,125 these sections, in turn, do not necessarily aid courts faced with
determining whether a guardian may bring a divorce action on behalf of an
incompetent ward.

120. Id. § 9-12-301(b)(6)(C)(i).
121. See id. § 9-12-301(b)(6)(A).
122. See id. § 9-12-301(b)(6)(C)(i).
123. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-302 (Repl. 2012).
124. Id. § 28-65-302(a)(1)(A)–(G). The only difference under subsection (a)(2), which
involves the rights of a guardian appointed after October 1, 2001, is that no guardian shall
make a decision that involves authorizing an incapacitated person to vote without filing,
petitioning, and receiving court approval. See id. § 28-65-302(a)(2)(E).
125. See id. § 9-12-301 (divorce); id. § 28-65-302 (guardianship).
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Arkansas Lacks Case Law Addressing Whether a Guardian May
File for Divorce on Behalf of a Ward

Appellate courts in Arkansas have yet to provide a holding on the merits, on which subsequent circuit courts may stand, as to whether a guardian
may file for divorce on behalf of a ward absent statutory authority. In Jackson v. Bowman,126 the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed a suit by an
insane widow to set aside a previously granted divorce decree to her deceased husband.127 The court ultimately held that the suit to set aside the
divorce decree was proper because the property interests of the insane widow were vitally affected by the default divorce decree entered against her.128
Additionally, service upon the husband’s executor as well as the husband’s
attorney of record constituted sufficient and proper notice to allow the trial
court to act on the petition to vacate.129
In Jackson, the court further opined that, because her husband was
mentally incompetent when he filed suit, the widow proved a meritorious
defense to the divorce action.130 The court cited the general rule for support—when a statute that authorizes suit is absent, an insane person cannot
bring an action for divorce because the right is strictly personal to the aggrieved spouse and no matrimonial offense automatically dissolves the marriage.131 However, the court never addressed the guardian’s right to file for
divorce, and the court’s mention of the general rule serves as dicta specific
to the incompetent spouse’s ability to petition for divorce.
Lovett v. Lovett132 followed almost twenty years later. Here, William
Lovett, by his father and next friend, filed a petition for divorce.133 The Supreme Court of Arkansas found no evidence that William was ever under
guardianship as to his person nor did he presently or recently need a personal guardian.134 Rather, guardianship over his estate was predicated on the
need to manage his business affairs.135 Therefore, the court determined that
the chancellor erred in not granting the petition for divorce.136
In Lovett, the court cited to 19 American Law Reports section 20 and
Jackson for recitation of the rule that, in the absence of a statute authorizing
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

226 Ark. 753, 294 S.W.2d 344 (1956).
Id. at 754, 294 S.W.2d at 344.
Id. at 757, 294 S.W.2d at 346.
Id. at 757–58, 294 S.W.2d at 346.
Id. at 759, 294 S.W.2d at 347.
Id., 294 S.W.2d at 347.
254 Ark. 349, 493 S.W.2d 435 (1973).
Id. at 350, 493 S.W.2d at 435.
Id. at 353, 493 S.W.2d at 437.
Id., 493 S.W.2d at 437.
Id. at 352, 493 S.W.2d at 437.
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so, an insane person cannot institute an action for divorce.137 The court then
noted, however, that in the same annotation it stated that, absent a legal adjudication of insanity, a person is presumed to have capacity to bring a divorce action as long as the plaintiff can understand the nature of the action.138 Thus, like Jackson, the court based its decision around the incompetent’s right to file for divorce and did not determine the rights of a guardian.
Most recently, the Arkansas Court of Appeals in Alexander v. Alexander139 was presented with the issue of whether the lower court erred in granting a divorce decree to a spouse who was later declared to be incompetent.140
Nevertheless, the court held on other grounds.141 Determining that there was
no evidence that corroborated either party’s residence in Arkansas for the
statutory period,142 the court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
enter the divorce decree because statutory law precludes a grant of divorce
without such corroboration of residency.143
Having reached its holding on a jurisdictional ground, the court in Alexander decided that other issues need not be addressed.144 One of these
issues was the Appellant’s contention that the trial court erred in granting a
divorce decree to the Appellee because she was incompetent at the time the
complaint was filed.145 Therefore, courts were, yet again, left void of a holding on which this issuewhether a guardian is legally entitled to bring an
action for divorce on behalf of a ward—could be resolved.
III. ARGUMENT
Absent clear statutory authority that expressly grants or denies a guardian the right to file for divorce on behalf of a ward, lower courts are faced
with choosing either the majority or minority approach. Because circuit
courts in Arkansas lack an appellate court holding that addresses whether a
guardian may petition the court on behalf of a ward and because statutory
authority does not explicitly grant or deny such authority, uncertainty pervades this issue. Arkansas legislators can be proactive, however, in proposing legislation to explicitly grant a guardian the right to file for divorce on
behalf of a ward. In doing so, this authority will avoid the inevitable result—
137. See id. at 353–54, 493 S.W.2d at 437–38.
138. Lovett, 254 Ark. at 354, 493 S.W.2d at 438.
139. No. CA01-1246, 2002 WL 1204416 (Ark. Ct. App. June 5, 2002).
140. Id. at *1.
141. See id.
142. Id. at *2; see ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-307 (Repl. 2009) (stating that residence in the
state for sixty days by either party prior to commencement of the action must be proven).
143. Alexander, 2002 WL 1204416, at *2.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *1.
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courts legislating from the bench. Alternatively, if no such legislation is
enacted, Arkansas courts should still follow the minority approach and then
use a substituted judgment standard in determining whether to grant a divorce action brought by a guardian.
A.

Due to the Current State of the Law in Arkansas, a Circuit Court Faced
with Determining Whether a Guardian May File Suit on Behalf of a
Ward Could Hold with Either the Majority or Minority

When a court is presented with this issue, the role the majority rule
would play in Arkansas is straightforward: absent statutory authority providing a guardian the right to file for divorce on behalf of a ward, a guardian
may not do so.146 As previously provided, a court’s reasoning behind following the majority approach lies in the personal and volitional nature of marriage and the “lesser of two evils” notion.147 The application of this rule is
not so straightforward, however, when courts consider the competing interests advocated by the minority.148 As illustrated in Part II, courts may construe other statutes, individually or in totality, and grant a guardian the legal
right to file for divorce.149 Consequently, unpredictability exists in cases of
first impression.
In Arkansas, language apt to result in statutory interpretation that
would grant the guardian authority to bring a suit may be found under Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-65-106. This section states that “[a]n
incapacitated person for whom a guardian has been appointed is not presumed to be incompetent and retains all legal and civil rights except those
which have been expressly limited by court order or have been specifically
granted by order to the guardian by the court.”150 Like Ruvalcaba and Nelson, an Arkansas court could construe this language broadly and reason that
the statute explicitly states that an incapacitated person retains all legal and
civil rights, which would include divorce because divorce is a civil proceeding.
Of course, under this section, the court cannot turn to the latter part of
this statute for clarity. A ward’s legal right to file for divorce has not been
expressly limited by court order nor has a guardian’s right to bring action

146. Wood v. Beard, 107 So. 2d 198, 199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (“The rule is well
established in the United States by the overwhelming weight of authority that a guardian of a
mentally incompetent person cannot bring and maintain an action for divorce on behalf of his
insane ward unless there has been legislative enactment to authorize such procedure.”).
147. See supra Part II.B.2.
148. See supra Part II.C.2.
149. See supra Part II.C.1.
150. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-106 (Repl. 2012) (emphasis added).
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been expressly granted.151 Subsequently, this language leaves the court in a
dilemma when determining whether a guardian has authority to file for divorce on behalf of the ward.
Additionally, like Luster, the court could read Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-65-106 in tandem with another statute, such as Arkansas Code
Annotated section 28-65-301, in granting the guardian the right to file action
on behalf of the ward. Section 28-65-301 states that “[i]t shall be the duty of
the guardian of the person, consistent with and out of the resources of the
ward’s estate, to care for and maintain the ward . . . .”152 Arguably, caring
for and maintaining the ward would include deciding whether it best for the
ward to remain in his or her marriage.
Moreover, the court could also read Arkansas Code Annotated sections
28-65-106 and 28-65-305 together. Section 28-65-305 provides the following:
When there is a guardian of the estate, all actions between the ward or
the guardian and third persons in which it is sought to charge or to benefit the estate of the ward shall be prosecuted by or against the guardian
of the estate as guardian, and the guardian shall represent the interests of
the ward in the action.153

It is important to note that this provision concerns the guardian’s power over
the estate, not the ward’s person. Nevertheless, it is possible that a court
may construe whatever statute it may find useful to determine this issue.
Therein lies the need for clarity—the need to explicitly give the court guidance.
B.

The Arkansas General Assembly Should Propose Legislation That
Grants a Guardian the Right to Bring Divorce Proceedings on Behalf of
a Ward

Though this note proposes that the rationale behind the minority approach is ultimately more applicable than the majority approach and should
be adopted by the court in the event it is presented with this issue absent
statutory authority, this matter can be addressed prior to reaching an appellate court. Specifically, the Arkansas General Assembly can address this
issue now by enacting a statute that gives the guardian a definitive legal
right to bring a divorce action on behalf of a ward.

151. See id. § 28-65-302 (Repl. 2012).
152. Id. § 28-65-301(a)(1) (Repl. 2012) (emphasis added).
153. Id. § 28-65-305(a) (Repl. 2012) (emphasis added).
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Other States’ Approaches That Provide Guidance

In Indiana, specific statutory authority addresses the legal right of the
guardian to bring dissolution proceedings.154 Section 29-3-9-12.2 states in
relevant part that “[i]f a guardian of an incapacitated person determines that
a dissolution of the incapacitated person’s marriage is in the best interests of
the incapacitated person, the guardian shall petition the court to request the
authority to petition for a dissolution of marriage on behalf of the incapacitated person.”155
In comparison, Missouri’s statutory code section 475.091 provides the
following:
Upon finding that the transaction was or is beneficial to the protectee, the
court may approve, ratify, confirm and validate any transaction entered
into by a conservator of the estate, without court authorization which it
has power under this section to authorize the conservator to conduct. The
power of the court to approve, ratify, confirm and validate transactions
entered into by a conservator of the estate without court authorization includes, without limitation, . . . the power to make, ratify and undertake
proceedings for, and agreements incident to, dissolution of the marriage
of the protectee.156

In Parmer v. Michaels,157 a Missouri court turned to this statute, specifically,
in addressing and refuting appellant’s argument that “no specific statute
authorizes a guardian to proceed in a dissolution action for an incapacitated
person . . . .”158
In drafting legislation, the Arkansas General Assembly could also look
to the court rules cited by the Michigan Court of Appeals in Smith v.
Smith.159 For example, when deciding whether a mentally incompetent
spouse could bring a divorce action through her guardian, the court in Smith
turned to two General Court Rules that existed at the time this case was decided and concluded that the guardian may do so.160 First, the court looked at
154. See IND. CODE § 29-3-9-12.2 (West 2014).
155. Id. § 29-3-9-12.2(a)(1), (3) (citations omitted). This section subsequently includes
the role of the court in granting the guardian’s petition. See id. § 29-3-9-12.2(d)–(g).
156. MO. ANN. STAT. § 475.091 (West 2009).
157. 755 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
158. Id. at 6. The court, citing Missouri Annotated Statute section 475.110, also added
that the language in that section reveals that the legislature “contemplate[d] that incapacitated
persons may be parties to divorce action.” Id. at 6–7. That section provides that “[w]hen the
spouse of an incapacitated or disabled person is appointed his guardian or conservator, such
spouse shall be removed as guardian or conservator upon dissolution of his marriage with the
incapacitated or disabled person.” MO. ANN. STAT. § 475.110 (West 2009).
159. 335 N.W.2d 657 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
160. See id. at 658.
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General Court Rule 1963, 722.2.161 This rule provided that “[a]ctions for
divorce and separate maintenance by or against incompetent persons shall
be brought as provided in sub-rule 201.5.”162 Then, the court examined subrule 201.5, which provided that “[w]henever an infant or incompetent person has a guardian of his estate, actions may be brought and shall be defended by such guardian in [sic] behalf of the infant or incompetent person.”163
Finally, Florida provides further illustration.164 Florida Statutes Annotated section 61.052 states that “[n]o judgment of dissolution of marriage
shall be granted unless one of the following facts appears, which shall be
pleaded generally: . . . Mental incapacity of one of the parties.”165 Additionally, section 744.3215 states that “[w]ithout first obtaining specific authority
from the court . . . a guardian may not [i]nitiate a petition for dissolution of
marriage for the ward.”166 In Vaughan v. Vaughan,167 a Florida court relied
on these sections and concluded that section 61.052 gives the guardian authority to initiate dissolution.168 Given this backdrop of statutory code from
numerous states, the Arkansas General Assembly has an adequate amount of
guidance from which to draw upon in drafting legislation.
2.

The Arkansas General Assembly Should Enact a New Subsection
to Its Guardianship Law or Follow Either Indiana’s or Florida’s
Approach

The Arkansas General Assembly has the opportunity to grant a guardian the legal right to file for divorce on behalf of a ward in multiple sections
of the Arkansas Code. Under guardianship law, the following proposed legislation could fit into section 28-65-302, which currently grants certain powers to guardians upon petition to the court.169 Subsection (a)(1) to section 2865-302 states that “[n]o guardian . . . shall make any of the following decisions without filing a petition and receiving express court approval” and

161. See id.
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. This is not an exhaustive list of states to which the Arkansas General Assembly can
turn. The listed states merely provide good examples.
165. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052(1)(b) (West 2006).
166. Id. § 744.3215(4)(c) (West 2010) (citations omitted).
167. 648 So. 2d 193 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
168. Id. at 195. The court also determined that section 744.3215 was enacted when “the
legislature clearly envisioned circumstances which would justify authorizing a guardian to
undertake the admittedly very personal act of seeking a dissolution on behalf of an incapacitated ward.” Id.
169. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-302 (Repl. 2012).
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then lists those subsequent decisions.170 Thus, for example, the following
could be added to the current list:
(H) Dissolution of marriage on behalf of the incapacitated person.

In the alternative, Arkansas legislators could replicate Indiana’s statute and
create an entirely new section that directly addresses petition by the guardian for the dissolution of marriage.171 In either case, both provisions would be
superior to the court rules in Michigan, where cross-references were necessary for the court in Smith to ultimately grant a guardian authority.172
Another option the Arkansas General Assembly could take would be to
follow Florida’s lead and amend its current divorce statute. Arkansas Code
Annotated section 9-12-301 currently states the following:
The circuit court shall have power to dissolve and set aside a marriage
contract, not only from bed and board, but from the bonds of matrimony,
for the following causes: In all cases in which a husband and wife have
lived separate and apart for three (3) consecutive years without cohabitation by reason of the incurable insanity of one (1) of them, the court shall
grant a decree of absolute divorce upon the petition of the sane spouse if
the proof shows . . . .173

As indicated by the language used in the statute—”upon the petition of the
sane spouse”—the insane spouse lacks legal authority.174 Admittedly, a party could make the argument that if the legislature had intended to grant the
insane spouse the authority to do so, then it would have included that right
expressly. Nevertheless, as exemplified in Ruvalcaba, this argument can be,
and has been, rejected in favor of the alternative—the notion that had the
legislature wanted to deny the insane spouse the right, it would have expressly done that too.175
If the Arkansas General Assembly followed Florida’s approach, one
option would be to state that the “[m]ental incapacity of one of the parties”
is one of the causes for which the circuit court can dissolve and set aside a
marriage,176 without limiting such action to “the petition of the sane spouse”
as it currently does.177 As held in Vaughan, this provision could give the

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
II.C.1.
176.
177.

See id.
See IND. CODE § 29-3-9-12.2 (West 2014); supra Part III.B.1.
See Smith v. Smith, 335 N.W.2d 657, 658 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983); supra Part III.B.1.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301(b)(6)(A) (Repl. 2009) (emphasis added).
See id.
See Ruvalcaba v. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d 674, 678 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); supra Part
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.052(1)(b) (West 2006); supra Part III.B.1.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301(b)(6)(A).
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guardian the “authority to initiate dissolution.”178 A second option would be
for the Arkansas General Assembly to add the following bracketed language
to the currently existing form:
. . . the court shall grant a decree of absolute divorce upon the petition of
the sane spouse [or insane spouse, through his or her guardian,] if the
proof shows . . . .179

Though the former proposal has sufficed in granting a guardian the legal
right to file for divorce on behalf of a ward, implementing language similar
to the latter proposal would be the most direct method in resolving the issue
at hand because it unambiguously grants the guardian express authority.
In sum, if the Arkansas General Assembly decides to take action, it
would not be the first legislative body to do so.180 Other states have codified
this right, and courts that have adjudicated this issue have relied on that codification in determining the rights of the guardian.181 By giving courts statutory authority on which to stand, the Arkansas General Assembly can adequately and proactively address this issue and, by doing so, prevent the possibility that courts will be forced to legislate from the bench.
C.

In the Absence of Legislation, Arkansas Appellate Courts Should Still
Employ the Minority Approach in Granting a Guardian the Legal Right
to Petition the Court for Divorce

Notwithstanding that the best option would be for the Arkansas General Assembly to propose legislation that explicitly grants a guardian the
right to file for divorce on behalf of a ward, courts should, in the alternative,
hold with the minority. Once a guardian has the legal authority to petition
the court for divorce on behalf of a ward, provided for either under statute or
by court authority, the court must next decide whether to grant the divorce.
In the absence of present evidence showing the ward’s desire to divorce, the
court should grant the divorce based on a substituted judgment standard as
opposed to a best interests standard.
1.

The Minority Approach Is the More Applicable Approach Given
Societal Changes and an Already Expansive Guardianship Law

In light of the reasons previously set out above, an appellate court
could read that either guardianship or divorce statutes, or their effect in tan178.
III.B.1.
179.
180.
181.

See Vaughan v. Vaughan, 648 So. 2d 193, 195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); supra Part
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-12-301(b)(6)(A).
See supra Part III.B.1.
See supra Part III.B.1.
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dem, grants a guardian the legal right to bring a suit for divorce on behalf of
the ward.182 Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that if the court is persuaded by the principles of the minority position, then the court would be even
more likely to construe a statute as broadly as possible to grant that right. In
declining to impose a per se ban on the guardian’s right to bring a divorce
suit, courts should be heavily persuaded not only by the minority’s foundational inequity argument183 but also by the broad power granted to guardians
in Arkansas specifically,184 as well as changing societal notions concerning
divorce.185
Currently, statutory authority in Arkansas grants guardians the authority to petition the court and potentially make decisions on behalf of the ward
that concern the following:
(A) Consent on behalf of the incapacitated person to abortion, sterilization, psychosurgery, or removal of bodily organs except when necessary
in a situation threatening the life of the incapacitated; (B) Consent to
withholding life-saving treatment; (C) Authorize experimental medical
procedures; (D) Authorize termination of parental rights; (E) Prohibit
the incapacitated person from voting; (F) Prohibit the incapacitated person from obtaining a driver’s license; or (G) Consent to a settlement or
compromise of any claim by or against the incapacitated person or his or
her estate.186

It would stand to reason that divorce is no more volitional or personal in
nature than some of the decisions in this statute. As the court in Ruvalcaba
aptly surmises, “in this day and age, when guardians are permitted to refuse
medical care on behalf of their incompetent wards—surely a decision that is
extremely ‘personal’ to that individual—prohibiting that same guardian
from maintaining an action for dissolution on behalf of the ward cannot be
justified.”187 For example, if physical or mental impairment does not destroy
the ward’s right to refuse medical treatment, impairment would also not
extinguish the incompetent’s right to petition for divorce.188 Effectively, the
majority’s primary policy rationale loses ground when it is compared to the
expansive guardianship provisions currently employed in this state.
Moreover, societal pressure and no-fault divorce laws further advance
the argument that guardians should be able to file for divorce on behalf of

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part II.C.2.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-302 (Repl. 2012).
Mills, supra note 38, at 528.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-65-302 (emphasis added).
Ruvalcaba v. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d 674, 681 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
Id.
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the ward.189 As opposed to narrowing no-fault divorce laws, the tendency
has been toward liberalizing them.190 During the 1960s, a uniform no-fault
divorce system began to replace fault-based divorce laws,191 and every state
in the union recognized no-fault divorce by 1985.192 Essentially, no-fault
divorce reform gave autonomy to the individual193 and allowed for marriage
to be “freely and unilaterally terminable.”194 Thus, the consent of both parties was no longer a requisite for divorce.
The result of this legislation and, ultimately, the ability of one spouse
to unilaterally dissolve the marriage was that the institution of marriage was
forever tarnished moving forward.195 Today, the divorce rate has reached an
estimated fifty percent.196 The correlation between the two cannot go unnoticed for the rate of divorce post no-fault divorce legislation is staggering.
After no-fault divorce laws were introduced in the 1960s, the divorce rate
nearly doubled over the next ten years.197
Importantly, with the adoption of no-fault divorce laws, “[s]ociety
[had] entered a new era.”198 These laws illustrated, to some extent, that society no longer condemned divorce.199 Additionally, since the enactment of
these laws, “society has continued in its acceptance and accommodation of
the life changes it has brought.”200 Specifically, because this accommodation
extends to the courts, the court’s role transformed from one designed to protect marriage to one designed to administer the dissolution of marriage in a
fair manner for the parties.201 In sum, “in [the] days of . . . no-fault dissolutions and the other vagaries of a vastly changing society, . . . an absolute rule
189. Mills, supra note 38, at 528.
190. Nelson v. Nelson, 878 P.2d 335, 340 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Garner v. Garner,
512 P.2d 84, 87 (N.M. 1973)).
191. Metzmeier, supra note 105, at 952.
192. Id. at 953.
193. Catherine Shaw Spaht, Why Covenant Marriage?, 46 LA. B. J. 116, 118 (1998).
194. Susan Reach Winters & Thomas D. Baldwin, Cultural Changes—1970–2000: The
“Divorce Revolution”, 10 N.J. PRAC., FAM. L. & PRAC. § 1A.2 (Database updated November
2015).
195. Austin Caster, Article, Why Same-Sex Marriage Will Not Repeat the Errors of NoFault Divorce, 38 W. ST. U. L. REV. 43, 50 (2010).
196. Id. at 46; see Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991
B.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 118 (1991) (citing analysts who have estimated that half of all marriages
today will end in divorce).
197. Caster, supra note 195, at 46. This period during the 1970s became known as the
“divorce boom.” Id. at 48; see Wardle, supra note 196, at 117 (citing statistical research that
demonstrates a causal relationship between no-fault divorce laws and divorce rates).
198. Winters & Baldwin, supra note 194, at § 1A.2.
199. Spaht, supra note 193, at 118.
200. Winters & Baldwin, supra note 194, at § 1A.2.
201. Metzmeier, supra note 105, at 953; see Mills, supra note 38, at 528 (providing that
no-fault divorce laws led to judicial administration of divorce on the basis of fairness as opposed to a legally recognized offense).
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[that guardians have no authority to seek a divorce or dissolution] is not
justified nor in the public interest.”202
2.

Courts Should Employ a Substituted Judgment Standard over a
Best Interests Standard to Grant a Divorce

The mere authority for a guardian to bring action does not suggest that
courts should proceed without caution in granting a divorce action brought
by the guardian,203 and the guardian should bear the burden in proving a
factual basis that supports divorce.204 Once the “courthouse door[s]” are
opened to allow a guardian to bring a divorce suit, however, the court should
then follow the substituted judgment standard in granting divorce when the
ward cannot express his or her wishes.205
Either standard protects against abuse by the guardian,206 but the substituted judgment standard is the more appropriate standard for the trial court
to apply for two reasons: (1) this standard involves the trial court considering evidence of “the ward’s prior or present acts, beliefs and disposition
toward the proposed divorce” in determining what choice the ward would
have made if competent,207 and (2) a best interests standard is inadequate for
determining the interests of the ward because it is applied only when no
evidence of the ward’s intent exists.208 It follows that by employing a best
interests standard the court would be adding yet another layer of decision
making on behalf of a ward.
In contrast with the best interests standard, a substituted judgment
standard allows the incompetent ward to retain his choice, which promotes
human dignity and self-determination.209 In essence, this standard attempts
to treat the incompetent “as an individual with free choice and moral dignity, and not as someone whose preferences no longer matter[].”210 This autonomy is achieved because the guardian either has actual knowledge of
what the ward would have done in the present circumstances or, based on
the ward’s prior general statements, actions, values, or preferences, the
guardian may understand what the ward would have done in the circum202. In re Gannon, 702 P.2d 465, 467 (Wash. 1985).
203. Nelson v. Nelson, 878 P.2d 335, 340 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
204. Id.; Pentecost v. Hudson, 252 P.2d 511, 512 (N.M. 1953) (explaining that the party
asserting action bears the burden of proving the factual basis that supports divorce).
205. Metzmeier, supra note 105, at 967.
206. Id. at 968.
207. Id. at 967.
208. Id. at 957.
209. Cantor, supra note 105, at 1204. The rationale is based on the preservation of rights.
Weber, supra note 106, at 136.
210. Cantor, supra note 105, at 1204 (quoting John A. Robertson, Organ Donations by
Incompetents and the Substituted Judgment Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 48, 63 (1976)).
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stances.211 Thus, the decision stands as that of the ward’s, and the court
simply acts as a “mouthpiece.”212 In contrast, the best interests standard results in the court taking responsibility for the decision213 and acting like the
parent of an infant with reduced rights.214
In support of why the substituted judgment standard is more appropriate, Arkansas courts may turn to prior case law. For example, Ruvalcaba
provides guidance in applying the substituted judgment standard.215 The
Ruvalcaba court, having determined that a guardian could initiate divorce
proceedings, addressed the evidentiary standard for deciding whether this
particular guardian-initiated divorce was proper.216
In Ruvalcaba, evidence existed of the incompetent ward’s desires concerning divorce at a time when she was competent.217 The court determined
that a trial court could consider any admissible evidence of the ward’s desires while competent, which may include written manifestations or statements made to third parties.218 Notably, the court allowed third-party testimonial evidence out of necessity and under hearsay exceptions.219 Regarding
this testimony, the court provided that the trial court has deference in assessing the truthfulness of third parties’ testimony and determining the appropriate weight to give this testimony.220 Ultimately, a trial court could
proceed in granting a divorce if dissolution was what the ward would
want221 after concluding the ward’s preferences and general values regarding
marriage, divorce, and manner of living.222
Likewise, in Nelson, the court determined that the guardian may testify
about conversations where the ward expressed his or her desires prior to

211. Lawrence A. Frolik & Linda S. Whitton, The UPC Substituted Judgment/Best Interest Standard for Guardian Decisions: A Proposal for Reform, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 739,
753–54 (2012). Under the latter, although the guardian does not have definitive information
as to what the ward wants, the guardian effectively best estimates what the ward would have
done by making reasonable inferences. Id. at 754.
212. Weber, supra note 106, at 137.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 138.
215. See Ruvalcaba v. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d 674, 682 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993).
216. See id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 683.
221. Ruvalcaba, 850 P.2d at 681–82.
222. Id. This court even heightened the burden of proof to a clear and convincing standard. Id. at 683. Though preponderance of evidence is all that is required in civil cases, the
court reasoned that an elevated standard was necessary because the dissolution of marriage
involved personal interests that were more complex and important than those of a typical
civil suit. Id.
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becoming incompetent.223 The court opined that the values of the ward
should be primary in determining whether the guardian should file for divorce.224 Thus, when the court is convinced by testimony from friends, family members, clergy, or other sources with knowledge that the ward would
not have wanted divorce under any circumstances, the court should uphold
the ward’s wishes.225 However, when there is evidence of an expressed desire to end the marriage prior to becoming incapacitated, the court should
not prohibit a guardian from bringing action.226 In such case, the trial court
may consider the evidence in granting or denying a divorce.227
In contrast with Ruvalcaba and Nelson, the court in Kronberg v.
Kronberg228 addressed a case in which evidence of intent was lacking. 229
After determining that statutory authority granted a guardian the right to
initiate divorce on behalf of a ward,230 the court next determined what was in
the best interest of the ward.231 Even with no evidence of the ward’s intent,
the court ultimately upheld the guardian’s ability to obtain a divorce on behalf of the ward,232 basing its holding on the ward’s interest in the estate and
equitable property rights.233
Whereas a substituted judgment standard provides a court with objective evidence of the ward’s intent to dissolve the marriage,234 the same is not
always true with a best interests standard.235 It is one thing to claim that a
per se rule denying guardians the legal authority to bring divorce is improper and to then advocate for proposed legislation that would at least grant a
guardian this legal right. It is quite another to suggest that a court can make
a subsequent judgment on behalf of the ward without any objective evidence
of the ward’s desires.
In bringing suit, the guardian is a third party making a decision for the
ward. Equally, under a best interests standard, the court would also be a
third party making a decision for the ward. However, this ensuing extension
of power to the court under a best interests standard would go too far be223. Nelson v. Nelson, 878 P.2d 335, 339 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
224. Id. at 340.
225. Id. at 341.
226. Id.
227. See id.
228. 623 A.2d 806 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993).
229. See id. at 809.
230. See id. at 809–10.
231. See id. at 811.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 813. The court reasoned that it was a court of equity, where a result that was
fair for both spouses was ideal. Id.
234. Frolik & Whitton, supra note 211, at 753–54.
235. Metzmeier, supra note 105, at 957 (explaining that the best interests standard applies
when no evidence of the ward’s intent exists).
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cause it adds another layer of decision making on behalf of a ward. Ideally,
a substituted judgment standard is able to prevent that additional third-party
decision by the court and allow the ward, to an extent, to retain his volition
in the marriage.
IV. CONCLUSION
An Arkansas appellate court will inevitably face the issue of determining a guardian’s right to file for divorce on behalf of a ward, just as other
state courts have in the past236 and especially given the growth of the elderly
population237 and high rates of divorce in this country.238 In the absence of
explicit statutory authority either granting a guardian the right to file for
divorce on behalf of a ward or denying the guardian such right, an appellate
court would be forced to consider the rationale behind the majority and minority rules in reaching a conclusion. The unpredictability of a court’s decision is pause for concern—concern that merits attention.
Because appellate courts have yet to hold on the merits of this issue 239
and because divorce law and guardianship law fail to explicitly provide
guidance,240 Arkansas courts are left without a clear answer. Therefore, the
time is ripe for action, and the most obvious answer to prevent courts from
being put in this position is legislation. By being proactive, the Arkansas
General Assembly can prevent this issue from rearing its head in court and,
thereby, prevent courts from being forced to legislate from the bench.
The proposed legislation encapsulates the trending aims of guardianship power by permitting a guardian to bring an action for the dissolution of
marriage on behalf of a ward.241 Then, once the action reaches the court, the
court should follow a substituted judgment standard in granting or denying
the divorce.242 To that end, the ward will still play a role in the ultimate dissolution of his or her marriage and, therefore, address the concerns of the
majority opinion amongst the states.243

236. See supra Parts II.B–C.
237. See Feinstein, supra note 12, at 208 (claiming that the population of persons age
sixty-five and older will double by 2030, and, currently, half of those persons over eightyfive have some form of dementia).
238. See supra Part III.C.1.
239. See supra Part II.D.2.
240. See supra Part II.D.1.
241. See supra Parts II.C, III.B.2.
242. See supra Part III.C.2.
243. See supra Part II.B.
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